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ABSTRACT  
 
“Pay, Protection, And Professionalism”: The History of Domestic Worker Organizing and  
the Future of Home Health Care in the United States 
by 
Julia R. Gruberg 
 
Advisor: John Goering 
 
 With a multidisciplinary approach, I analyze the socio-economic, political, and historical 
factors that led to the current state of home health care in the United States. The legacy of 
slavery and the devaluing of so-called “women’s work” explain how the field of domestic work 
has been historically excluded from protection and regulation in the United States. Caring for 
children and keeping house have been women’s work for centuries, regardless of whether 
women were paid to do it or it was outsourced to an employee. Domestic work is sometimes 
referred to as “the work that makes all other work possible,” but this phrase silences the fact that 
the home has historically been the main site of work for women, and reinforces the idea that the 
private sphere and its labors are apolitical and not “real” work. The gendering of the male public 
sphere and the female private home has hampered efforts at regulation, because the home is not 
seen as a site of productive labor.  
 The story of domestic work in the twentieth century is a crystal lens through which to 
view the creation of whiteness and reification of Other. The low status of domestic work as an 
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occupation is rooted in who has traditionally done domestic work for others: women, often Black 
or otherwise considered non-white. I examine the mutability of whiteness throughout the late 
19th and 20th century, and describe the demographics of the current workforce – mostly 
immigrant women of color – as well as the aging population served by eldercare workers. 
As the population ages and more Americans find themselves in the Sandwich Generation 
– caring for parents and children simultaneously – society will face a care crisis. This crisis 
bridges multiple issues that affect every level of civil society and government: children, parents, 
the elderly; independent contractors, for- and non-profit agencies, trade schools; and state-run 
licensing, regulations, and enforcement. We must figure out how to help families afford quality 
care, empower workers, and close the wage gap for women who, in the prime of their careers, 
are caring for their parents and children.  
 New York State is a good case study for regulations of domestic work. We can compare 
it with a successful reorganization of domestic work in Belgium. Yet the United States 
government’s move towards austerity in the current moment does not bode well for regulations, 
protections, enforcements, and supports for workers and employers, all of which would require 
the state to step in as a key player. 
 I propose an idea for a public-private partnership to support the eldercare community. 
Such a partnership, between the city, the state, and home care agencies, would facilitate high 
quality care and care jobs. Domestic workers would form a cooperative agency, meaning 
workers would do different tasks to keep the organization running. Structured as a co-op, the 
workers can rotate between direct care and management, including website design and 
development, customer service, fundraising, accounting, and human resources. A liaison would 
work with the department for the aging, workforce development organizations, and advocacy 
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groups to streamline the process of finding and hiring a qualified domestic worker – and for the 
workers to find safe and respectful employment. Such a program would provide some redress to 
the workers who are grappling with the racist and sexist legacies of the field, as well as current 
prejudices. 
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Introduction  
Throughout United States history, domestic work has often not been considered “real” 
work for sociological, political, and economic reasons. Domestic work has in the past and into 
the present day been seen as the chore and duty of women. Even women who worked outside the 
home for pay came home to work “the second shift” inside the home – for no pay.  
The meaning and position of domestic work has been constructed to have multiple 
meanings depending on who is performing it: the person who lives in the house, or the paid 
worker. This work has also been racialized, with major roots in the US practice of slavery and 
race-based oppression of women. Most women in the second wave feminist movement were 
arguing for the right to work outside the home, and in doing so they diminished the value and 
difficulty of home work as well as the women doing the work, mostly women of color.   
 As the Baby Boomers age, and elders live for longer, the need for paid domestic labor in 
the United States will only increase. For example, my 101-year-old grandmother, known as 
Nana, had refused any help until she was 98, when she realized she could not comfortably cook 
for herself anymore. So she allowed my mom to hire someone to live with her, do her grocery 
shopping, cook for her, and help her pay bills.  
 The person living with Nana is really a good person, but he is not a home health care 
worker. He is actually a graduate student, living rent-free in exchange for taking care of Nana. 
He is not a professional caregiver or home health aide, which means he is not trained to care for 
an elderly, frail person with mild dementia. Frankly, his duties are not very well defined. Is he 
supposed to provide emotional support and companionship for Nana as well as household duties? 
When is his time off? I believe the person caring for Nana should be getting paid enough that 
they can afford to live on their own.  
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 I would much prefer a professional home care attendant, someone who understands the 
aging process and whose job it is to care for Nana. There are countless home health agencies in 
Los Angeles, but my mom – like most other Americans – cannot tell which one to choose. There 
is no way to tell if each agency operating online is a nation-wide franchise or a reputable non-
profit, or what specific services they provide. Does the agency exploit its workers by employing 
them below benefits-eligible hours? Would the agency send a new, different person every week? 
Plus, 24-hour care at $30/hour is not affordable, even for those who, like Nana, have sufficient 
resources. Medicaid-eligible seniors can access some subsidized home health care, and after 
surgery, Medicare will cover some home health care. Some states allow consumer-directed care, 
in which the client can appoint a home health aide to be paid through the client’s Medicaid 
coverage. Nana, who is not eligible for Medicaid, is spending every last cent on home care so she 
can age in place, in the home she has lived in since 1964. What happens when her money runs 
out? 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the historical and sociological conditions that 
gave rise to the current state of home health care in the United States, and to propose a new 
model for home health care in New York City. My methodology includes research on labor 
history, theoretical analysis of race and migration, and discussion of current legislation and 
policies around domestic work. In this thesis, I trace the history, successes, and failures of 
domestic worker organizing in the 20th century to a new model for home health care. I present an 
idea for a public-private partnership to support the eldercare community in creating a worker-run 
cooperative. This would bring domestic work into the public sphere, allow older New Yorkers to 
age in place, and provide quality jobs to a long-overlooked workforce. 
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 With a multidisciplinary approach, I analyze the socioeconomic, political, and historical 
factors that led to the current state of home health care in the United States. The legacy of 
slavery and the devaluing of so-called “women’s work” help explain how the field of domestic 
work has been historically excluded from protection and regulation in the United States. Caring 
for children and keeping house have been women’s work for centuries, regardless of whether 
women were unpaid slaves, paid to do it, or it was outsourced to a firm or employee. Domestic 
work is sometimes referred to as “the work that makes all other work possible,” but this phrase 
obscures the fact that the home has historically been the main site of work for women, and 
reinforces the idea that the private sphere and its labors are non-political and not “real” work. In 
addition to the formative role of slavery, the gendering of the male public sphere and the female 
private home has significantly hampered efforts at regulation, because the home is not seen as a 
site of productive labor.  
 The story of domestic work in the twentieth century is also a crystal lens through which 
to view the creation of whiteness and reification of Others. The low status of domestic work as 
an occupation is rooted in who has traditionally done domestic work for others: women, often 
Black or otherwise considered non-white. I examine the persistence and mutability of whiteness 
as it relates to domestic labor in the United States. Today, mostly immigrant women of color 
comprise the current home care workforce. As such, domestic work today cannot be discussed 
without also discussing international migration and the global care chain.  
As the United States population ages and more Americans are in the Sandwich 
Generation, caring for parents and children simultaneously, we find ourselves at the beginning of 
a substantial care crisis. New York State is a good case study for both this crisis and for the 
regulation of domestic work. I examine the successful reorganization of domestic work 
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undertaken by Belgium and take it as a starting point for a new model for home health care. The 
US government’s move towards fiscal austerity over the last several years does not bode well for 
regulations, protections, enforcements, and supports for workers and employers, all of which 
would require the state to step in as a key player. Yet in the face of opposition, domestic worker 
organizing over the past 100-plus years prevailed, notably in the 1970s and 2010s. By learning 
from the robust and intersectional domestic workers’ movement of the 20th and 21st centuries, 
activists of today can create a movement that will effect legislative change to provide workers 
and employers better quality jobs and better quality care.  
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Chapter 1. Theorizing Domestic Work in the United States  
1.i. Early Accounts of Paid Domestic Work  
 As far back as the antebellum North, there are records of employers’ views of their rights 
and responsibilities – as well as their grievances. “[American] employers’ diaries and letters of 
the 1830s complained constantly about their difficulty in finding and keeping servants” and their 
dismay at employing immigrants instead of American women (Lasser, 1992, p. 122). Immigrant 
workers preferred live-in service, because it meant their room and board expenses were taken 
care of and they could send the majority of their pay back home (Lasser 1992). Yet moneyed 
New England matrons in the 1850s were loathe to hire Irish workers – evidence of the 
timelessness of the mutability of whiteness. One woman lamented that before 1850 her servants 
were “always American,” but “when no more American servants could be found, like everyone 
else we had Irish” (Lasser, 1992, p. 124).  
 In 1869 Catharine Beecher, a prominent writer on women’s issues, expressed surprise 
and dismay at the newly arrived Irish and German “girls” who believed they understood and 
were entitled to American democracy. Her advice to her fellow employers: “...It is much better to 
regulate [workplace negotiations] by cool contract in the outset than by warm altercations and 
protracted domestic battles” (Lasser, 1992, p. 126). Unsurprisingly, servants viewed this 
“benevolent maternalism” as anachronistic and unequal to the rights granted to other workers 
(Lasser, 1992, p. 130). The difference is that domestic workers are in the private sphere; workers 
in the public sphere would expect (and receive) a less familial workplace environment. Edward 
Godkin, editor of The Nation, pointed this out in his commentary in the January 1873 issue, 
explaining that although it may be inconvenient to employers, servants were acting based on 
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their own best interests and participating in the free market as other workers were becoming able 
to do.  
 Employers were expected to provide both maternal caretaking for the servant as well as 
material training in housekeeping, as the “girl” was basically an apprentice at housewifery 
(Lasser 1992; Palmer 1989). Lasser cites several examples of maids and servants who were 
unhappy with their employment situations and decamped for a better job; some employers were 
sad when their “girls” left, implying their maternal inclination was hard to shake. Even as 
employers, women were expected to do the (unpaid) emotional labor of caring for their workers. 
How could the home be seen as a public workplace in that situation? Ultimately, domestic 
servants did not desire apprenticeship, but employment; Lasser argues this affected the 
homemaking skills of the next generation of wives as they were not trained in housekeeping. 
  While data needed to clearly characterize domestic service over time is missing, Lucy 
Salmon’s widely-cited work from the 1890s supposedly proved domestic workers made as much 
or more than women employed in other jobs. Her conclusion was based on specious data, 
though: respondents were interested in maintaining their image and/or were ignorant of the 
amount of hours actually worked; a generous calculation of the value of room and board; a 
discounting of the hourly breakdown of the weekly wage, given that domestics worked many 
more hours than factory or shop workers; and servants’ wages were the last item on the budget 
list and so the first to go if expenses exceeded the budget (Berch 1992). The economic turndown 
of 1890-1920 would have made it a worker’s market, yet workers could not be found. Berch 
argues the “servant crisis” of those years was due to inadequate wages and poor working 
conditions, not the stigmatization of domestic work, as Salmon had claimed. Berch shows that 
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the income of domestic servants was not, as commonly thought in the late 1800s-early 1900s, 
equal to or better than jobs in other industries, such as factories, shops, or pubs. 
 The census data from which scholars estimate the proportion of women working in 
“domestic and personal service” is difficult to parse. From 1890 to 1920, the labor force 
participation of married women jumped across all races (Brownlee 1992). The percentage of 
women working in the “domestic and personal service” category of the census dropped from 
52% in 1870, to 22% in 1920 (Palmer, 1989, p. 12). “Native white” married women’s rates of 
participation in the labor force grew from 2.4% in 1890, to 3.1% in 1900, to 6.3% in 1920; 
“Negro” married women’s rates of participation in the labor force over that same period grew 
from 22.7%, to 26%, to 32.5% (Brownlee, 1992, p. 205). In 1920, around 16% of all employed 
women were laundry or domestic workers, while close to 50% of employed Black women were 
laundry or domestic workers – compared to 22% of employed foreign-born white women and 
8% of employed native-born white women (Palmer, 1989, p. xiii). From 1920 to 1940, Palmer 
estimates that domestic work constituted one-fifth of women’s employment. For the Black 
women workforce, employment as domestics rose to 60% in 1940 (Palmer, 1989, p. 12). But, as 
Brownlee points out, it census figures do not provide a wholly accurate picture of women’s labor 
force participation, especially over such a short time period, because the definitions of census 
categories and occupations frequently changed. 
 
1.ii. Domestic Work and Whiteness 
 The massive emigration to the United States in the decades before 1910 altered the 
cultural and domestic landscape in which middle-class urban white women lived. This group, the 
most common employer of domestic workers, saw their duties shift from arduous home labor to 
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a more leisured lifestyle (Palmer 1989). The availability of white foreign-born domestic workers 
decreased as emigration from Europe ceased during the First World War. Due to restrictions 
imposed in 1921 and 1924, immigration did not resume to the same extent after the war. After 
World War I, most white domestic workers were native-born, not foreign-born, but whites still 
constituted a minority of all domestic workers. (Palmer 1989). Each wave of immigrant groups, 
from the 1880s until much of immigration was first restricted in the 1920s with the Chinese and 
Asian exclusion orders, was considered non-white and was relegated to the most dangerous, 
lowest-paid labor: food processing, textile mills, and domestic work.  
 Whiteness in the United States was defined and limited by the “one-drop” rule: that even 
“one drop” of “non-white” blood made someone non-white. At the same time, whiteness was a 
mutable designation, dependent on other factors, including class. Society could not support a 
white class without an Other; whiteness and non-whiteness are mutually constructed. Thus, race-
based subordination – in the form of institutional racism – requires the willing and tacit 
cooperation and support of white persons (Mullings 2005). The definition of whiteness and who 
is considered white in the United States has changed greatly over the past 400 years.  
Meanings and constructions of race are historically dependent. Anthropology earned 
legitimacy as a discipline through its intense biologization of race in the early twentieth century, 
with such tactics as correlating skull size to racial characteristics or aptitude. The backlash to this 
biologization was the belief that, as Harrison writes, “race is a dangerous fallacy and the ethnic 
group concept has more heuristic value” (1995, p. 53). As a result, “ethnicity” became the term 
of choice. Although race is a social construct with no substantive basis in biology, its effects are 
very real.  
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 Populations that had been considered non-white were gradually offered the privileges of 
whiteness through both assimilation and affirmative action programs. Though Affirmative 
Action is most often associated with the Black population post-Civil Rights Era, there were 
government and social programs that helped lower classes of all races become socially mobile. 
From Roosevelt’s labor programs during the New Deal – the Works Progress Administration, 
national photography projects – to the GI Bill and better housing opportunities through federal 
home loans, white ethnic immigrants were gradually absorbed into white Americanness and 
privileges. Affirmative Action programs such as these have always worked much less well for 
Black populations, due to the racism that makes whites bristle at and politically oppose almost 
any kind of reparative policy. Prior to the New Deal, the efforts of Reconstruction were bearing 
fruit – the election of Black Congressmen and Senators, the success of “Black Wall Street” in 
Oklahoma – before the program was aggressively dismantled by Southern whites.  
 The linkage of race to labor has “structural consequences” in ways ethnicity does not 
(Harrison, 1995, p. 48). Ethnicity may be voluntary and self-assigned, while race and racism are 
always “imposed from above but experienced from below” (Mullings, 2005, p. 682). Ethnic 
identification is often chosen, whereas racial identification is almost never optional. Research, 
initiatives, identity groups, or equal opportunity programs focusing solely on ethnicity – a chosen 
identity – underplay historical oppression based on race. This is the difference between 
ethnoracial assignment, which is imposed, and ethnoracial identity, which is chosen (Brodkin 
1998). Today, whiteness includes all white ethnicities. To be Irish, Italian, or German today is 
simply to be white. But one hundred years ago, newly arrived immigrants of these ethnic 
categories were not seen as white, and were treated accordingly. Godkin, editor of The Nation, 
said in the same passage referenced above that Irish women were ignorant of “civilized domestic 
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life” and differed “in race and creed” from American women (1873, p. 7). Believing ethnicity to 
be truer than race is playing into a dangerous fallacy, as not all ethnic white immigrants at the 
turn of the 20th century were able to reap the same social citizenship benefits. 
 One example of a group who entered the United States decidedly non-white and achieved 
whiteness through Affirmative Action programs is Ashkenazi Jews. Arriving in waves beginning 
the 1860s, Jews set up successful ethnic enclaves in several US cities. In her eponymous book 
from 1998, Brodkin discusses how Jews became white. The first option Jews had to combat their 
racialization was through higher education. Jews earned entrance, but not social access, to Ivy 
League and other elite universities by high academic achievement. The true point of college in 
the early 20th century, though, was to join the old boys’ club, and Jews could not gain access to 
that club with intelligence or hard work alone. Through gaining admissions to selective 
occupational schools – dental, medical, law – and being able to afford it from the benefits of the 
GI Bill, Jews could join the middle-class workforce. Their housing options opened up, too, with 
access to new suburban Levittowns and low-interest mortgages in the mid-century. Living a 
secular Judaism in the suburbs among Protestant families granted a sort of whiteness by proxy; 
regardless of their at-home practice of Judaism, leaving the urban ethnic enclave was an 
important step in the appearance of mainstream American whiteness. Combined with the 
entrance of other racialized immigrant groups, and through embodying white behaviors and 
situations, Jews gradually assimilated. But there remained discrimination and religious bias, 
antisemitism, and a sense of Judaism as an unsheddable ethnicity, so Jews never obtained a full 
and permanent whiteness. Hiring a domestic worker allowed Jews to transcend their ethnic label 
and more firmly grasp a place with white Protestants in the suburbs (Brodkin 1998).  
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1.iii. Urbanization and Consumerism 
 As the US population urbanized throughout the later part of the 19th century, women’s 
daily work changed. In urban centers, middle-class white women no longer needed to do the 
traditional work of the nineteenth century: making soap and candles and clothing, growing and 
canning food, keeping animals, and other highly physical activities (Palmer 1989). Instead, with 
the advent of electric products for the house, shifting demands of wives and mothers, and, later, 
their entrance to the workforce, women hired servants to do this care and keeping work.  
 “…[W]hite female domesticity and the racial division of domestic labor have been 
historically constructed through consumerism,” writes Roberts (2010, p. 802). Race cannot be 
separated from capitalism and imperialism, he continues: “Indeed, the confines of the domestic 
space and its technologies bring the colonial project of whiteness into rehearsal in the home” 
(2010, p. 802). By the 1920s, consumerism was the bargaining chip women cashed in to 
experience satisfaction in the domestic realm. The modern woman employed a servant to keep 
the house tidy, look after the children, and help serve the husband. Being a boss of a servant was 
the closest she came to autonomy, for contemporary guidebooks emphasized women’s duty to 
the home as the highest calling (Palmer 1989). 
 Women were primarily defined as wives and mothers – that was not new, or unique to the 
Cult of True Womanhood – but as the demands on them in terms of manual labor were 
decreased, the demands in terms of social and emotional labor expanded. Brownlee locates one 
reason for white women’s limited work outside the home in the “unusual cultural heterogeneity” 
of late-19th-century urban life. Because of increased diversity in urban life and exposure to 
different cultures, middle and upper class women had a “powerful preoccupation...with the value 
of the family as an integrative institution and the role of women as protectors of traditional 
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values” (Brownlee, 1992, p. 210). Thus, servants were cheap and therefore became necessary. 
Servants could keep house while the wife tended to the needs of her husband, “developed the 
moral and intellectual capacities of her children” (Palmer, 1989, p. 5), and engaged in charity 
work. 
 The expense of novel household equipment was justified because it lightened the 
workload of the housewife, even though middle-class women were expected to have servants 
(Palmer 1989). The allure of appliances was a tradeoff based in capitalist consumption. The idea 
that buying something will bring happiness – that indeed, happiness is just one more purchase 
away – was sold to women homemakers as a solution to their desire for a more meaningful life 
outside the private home and their duties to the Cult of True Womanhood. “Women had the 
proper tools available, and they needed only to manage them properly to create leisure time for 
themselves,” Palmer writes (1989, p. 33). Fulfillment was promised via women’s management of 
other women employed to use the newly purchased, modern equipment. “…[O]nly the ability to 
turn over much of the work to other women – less powerful in age, class, or race and ethnicity – 
sealed their acceptance” of the tradeoff of modern appliances for a life at home (Palmer, 1989, p. 
3-4). The role of a housewife in consumer culture was not just buying products, but choosing 
which products to buy and use. Her choices and decisions on products and appliances reflected 
her standard of living, the modernity of her household, her up-to-date knowledge of 
technological changes, and communicated her household’s social connections to her peers 
(Palmer 1989).  
 The capitalist ideological justification from the 1920s was spun as a project for freedom: 
women were not trapped in the home by the heavy duties of the rural 19th-century housewife – 
tending farm animals, making clothing and soap – but were free to choose to remain in the home 
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to better the household. The modern woman’s “demands for self-fulfillment were appropriated 
and applied to marriage,” according to Palmer (1989, p. 22). In the 1920s, middle-class women 
were only seen as middle-class if they had hired help. Otherwise, they were no different from 
working-class women who did their own housework. Because even though they had household 
help, their main work was buying household appliances and telling the worker how, when, and 
where to use them. “Indeed, only the ability to hire some work kept the middle-class woman 
from looking like a working-class wife whose days were absorbed by housework,” Palmer writes 
(1989, p. 4). Palmer distinguishes between middle-class woman and working-class wife: the 
implication is that womanhood is not available to the working class, only wifedom. Womanhood 
is contingent upon class, and class came with the capitalist consumption of goods and services. 
 The marketing of these household appliances to middle-class women ensured that house 
work was entirely privatized. Housework and employment could have been centralized and 
distributed by a public or private company. For example, communal ovens were in use 
throughout England, France, Italy and many other countries since the Middle Ages. The workers 
– even the equipment – could have come from a state or private organization, with the 
organization as the intermediary between the homemaker and the domestic worker coming into 
her home. Indeed, agencies had been placing workers with employers since the 1850s (Lasser 
1992). But just as each household had its own vacuum cleaner and icebox, many had their own 
domestic worker. The private sphere was both an economic and an ideological formation 
(Altman & Pannell 2012). The secluded nature of domestic work, the isolation of the work, and 
that the workplace itself was someone else’s home, stunted domestic worker organizing efforts.  
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Chapter 2. Labor and Domestic Worker Organizing in the 20th Century  
2.i. World War I – 1930s: Early Organizing 
 In the early 20th century, social groups and civic society organizations existed to try to 
facilitate upward mobility of various oppressed groups, including women, African-Americans, 
immigrants, and laborers. The labor movement in the United States was started by workers at 
textile and garment factories on the East Coast. After labor injustices, including quashing steel 
strikes, mining tragedies, and the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire, communities organized 
themselves into unions to establish baseline worker protections.  
 Domestic workers, home economics experts, and labor reformers advocated for higher 
cash wages, fewer hours of work, a professionalization of the field of domestic work, and 
working contracts – similar to demands of the mainstream labor movement at the time (Nadasen 
2012). The predominately white mainstream labor movement was focused on organizing in the 
public sphere: garment factories, food production, and women’s suffrage (Orleck 1995). Black 
women workers were seen as unorganizable by Big Labor, partly due to the racism of union 
chiefs and partly because they were invisibilized in the private sphere of white women’s homes 
(Orleck 1995). Though some domestic worker groups did affiliate with the American Federation 
of Labor or the Congress of Industrial Operators, the groups could not bear the financial burden 
of paying dues to the AFL or CIO at the same rate as locals comprised of better-paid workers 
(Palmer 1989). Because Big Labor and mainstream women’s movements for suffrage were 
justifiably associated with racist behavior and beliefs, independent domestic worker groups 
played down the union-like quality of their organizations. These worker groups termed 
themselves “associations” and focused on “pay, protection, and professionalism” (Boris & 
Nadasen, 2008, p. 423). 
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 The dispersal of domestic workers into thousands of individual worksites, often with 
more than one employer per worker, was and is not conducive to traditional union organizing. 
“Most mainstream labor unions never identified domestic workers as part of their constituency,” 
Nadasen writes (2012, p. 77). Domestic worker groups turned instead to Young Women’s 
Christian Associations (YWCA) for institutional support and national reach (Palmer 1989). The 
YWCA was used by domestic organizers to unite women across class boundaries and from 
various work sites and viewpoints. “This model...gathered together scattered laborers and created 
bonds of solidarity through nonworkplace activities,” claim Boris and Nadasen (2008, p. 419). 
This gathering of workers and employers relied on the privileging of gender over race. The 
organizers brought workers and employers together based on their identity as women, setting 
aside the different consequences Blackness and whiteness has on womanhood. As domestic 
workers knew their work was labor that deserved to be recognized as such, just as factory 
workers, they created public legislative lobbying campaigns to pressure the state.  
 When the state failed to consider domestic workers as workers and protect them as such, 
some worker and employer groups promoted and adopted voluntary standards. Additionally, 
separate groups founded by employers worked to organize themselves to adopt an employer 
identity and encourage best practices. One good example of this is the National Committee on 
Household Employment (NCHE), organized in 1928 by the YWCA, which promoted a Code of 
Standards among domestic employers. To dignify the work and have it be recognized as real 
work rather than unskilled labor, the NCHE adopted more professional-sounding titles (such as 
“household technician”) and attempted to create a class of paraprofessional occupations (“elder 
companion, cook, clothing specialist, child care provider, and home manager”) that were 
regarded as “real” labor and regulated by the state as such (Boris & Nadasen, 2008, p. 421). The 
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NCHE also worked with private groups, such as the Urban League, to run education and training 
programs. The NCHE ran in this capacity until 1945, and then was re-started in the late 1960s as 
an organization by and for women of color (Palmer 1989; Boris & Nadasen 2008). 
 By the 1920s, after the passage of the 20th Amendment in 1916, the United States saw 
itself as completing the promise of democratic ideals it brought to WWI on the domestic front 
(Palmer 1989). Black women, however, remained effectively disenfranchised for another 40-plus 
years. Participation in a worker organization gave Black women access to the benefits of 
citizenship that they could not access in traditional ways. “Union organization was the norm for 
self-respecting workers during the 1930s,” writes Palmer (1989, p. 126). The the explicit 
exclusion of domestic workers from the Wagner Labor Relations Act in 1935 was discouraging 
for domestic worker organizers.  
 
2.ii. 1938 – 1945: Fair Labor Standards Act and World War II 
 In 1938, at the height of the New Deal and the Great Depression, President Roosevelt 
signed into law the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). FLSA created basic minimum wage and 
overtime pay standards, regulated the employment of minors, set recordkeeping standards for all 
workers involved in interstate commerce, and enacted other labor laws. FLSA did not establish 
requirements for maximum number of hours worked per day or week, vacation days, meal or rest 
time during the workday, severance or sick pay, holiday pay or time off, raises, or an explanation 
of termination (US DOL 2014). House opposition to the bill stemmed from the conservative 
influence of Republicans and Southern Democrats. Southern Congressmen argued for a lower 
minimum wage in their region, and Northerners said that without a federal nationwide minimum 
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wage, they would not be able to compete with the lower prices Southern factories could offer as 
a result of lower wages and operating costs (Grossman 1978).  
 Because of Southern pressure, the Fair Labor Standards Bill was altered to delay the 
enforcement of the increased minimum wage, and the labor board to be created was mandated to 
consider cost differentials of the South when recommending future wage increases (Grossman 
1978). But all these machinations were really a concession to the South to keep Black workers 
subjugated and impoverished. Most of the new protections did not apply to railroad, agricultural 
or domestic workers – a majority of whom were people of color. “The white male industrial 
employee became the prototypical worker,” Nadasen writes, “and that model informed 
assumptions about what constituted legitimate work” (2012, p. 76). As a result of passing FLSA, 
the Department of Labor estimated that up to 50,000 workers in the South lost their jobs, 90% of 
who worked in a select few industries (Grossman 1978).  
 The intent of FLSA was to regulate hours, wages, and child labor as permitted by the 
interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution. “Interstate commerce” was defined 
quite rigidly in the 1930s, and “domestic workers seemed the quintessential case of intrastate 
employment,” Palmer writes (1989, p. 121). As of 1938, FLSA covered 39% of male workers, 
but only 14% of women workers (Palmer 1998). The Southern Concession – a political deal cut 
to appease white southern lawmakers – meant that in most states, agriculture and domestic 
workers were to be excluded from labor regulation (Nadasen 2012; Palmer 1989).  
 With the passage of FLSA, the rights associated with national citizenship, including 
access to healthcare, education, and housing, became incontrovertibly linked to employment. 
These rights comprise social citizenship, a concept that includes civil, economic, political, and 
social rights. Because the Southern Concession determined who FLSA covered in its national 
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codification of labor standards, women and African-Americans were excluded from the benefits 
of social citizenship, as their main form of paid work – domestic work and agricultural work – 
were excluded from FLSA (Nadasen 2012). Nadasen characterizes FLSA as providing 
“exclusionary citizenship” (2012, p. 77). 
 A major point of domestic worker resistance was the expectation of a worker’s constant 
availability. “In [domestic service] there is no real end to the day; and in small households, the 
pursuit and oversight, and often the ‘nagging’ of the employer, or, in other words, the presence 
of an exacting, semi-hostile, and slightly contemptuous person is constant,” explained Godkin 
(1873, p. 7). Workers were not granted set hours off, were expected to be on-call during their 
informal breaks, and were paid 50% less while on break (Palmer 1989). In the 1930s workers 
pushed for a more regimented schedule, with set start and end times, set break times, and set 
days off, for both live-in and live-out workers (Palmer 1989). Employers resisted the so-called 
“mechanization” of the household and claimed that strict hours of work and rest were 
incompatible with childrearing and accommodation of children and men’s needs (Palmer 1989). 
Domestic workers were simultaneously invisible and viewed as the personal property of 
employers; the racialized othering of the workforce allowed employers to reconcile their abusive 
treatment of workers with their own “sense of fairness,” writes Nadasen (2012, p. 78). One early 
pamphlet distributed to housewives suggested a timeline for a domestic servant’s day and 
emphasized the need for flexibility to adapt to the husband’s last-minute request for a dinner 
party or, alternatively, a night out (Palmer 1989).  
 The home continued to be seen as a private place where government could not or should 
not intervene. Especially with care work – nannying, elder care, and caring for those with 
disabilities – the state, private companies, and private employers generally resisted attempts at 
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regulation. To care was to love, and love could not be regulated. Care was (and is) understood to 
be a natural outgrowth of maternal tendencies and is a lifetime requirement of being a wife, 
mother, daughter, sister. 
 During World War II, with the entry of women into other forms of work, domestic work 
hit a new low of 9.5% of all women workers (Palmer 1989). Supply and demand meant that 
wages increased, and more domestic worker locals were able to affiliate with the CIO (Palmer 
1989). Still, the push for formal recognition of domestic work as work was stymied. Federal 
government bureaus, state employment offices, the Urban League, and organizations such as the 
YWCA pressed for voluntary adoption of standards, knowing that legislative victories were out 
of reach (Palmer 1989). But the idea of the home as a workplace was incompatible with the 
elevation of the housewife and the commitment to the home as a sanctuary; the home was still 
considered “the 24-hour center of emotional support and physical nurturance” (Palmer, 1989, p. 
134). Thus, not for the first time, two deserving groups were pitted against each other in the 
service of the capitalist project: the needs of women workers and the needs of women employers. 
The YWCA and other interracial, cross-class organizations were unable to elevate one value 
(work regulations) over another (home as sanctuary), and could not create a robust legislative 
campaign around a singular issue (Palmer 1989). Domesticity won out over dignity for workers. 
Though some domestic workers did become eligible for Social Security through laws passed in 
1950 and 1954, the next upswell in organizing was not until the early 1970s (Boris & Klein 
2012). 
 In the mid-century, demographic and political changes led to the rise in specialized paid 
care work (Boris & Nadasen 2008). Elders began to live longer and women worked more outside 
the home. Men did not do housework to cover for what the women could no longer do while 
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working outside the home. Women had been hiring household help for domestic service, such as 
cleaning, cooking, and watching children, but the move to hire help to care for elders did not take 
root until the middle of the 20th century (Boris & Nadasen 2008).  
 
2.iii. 1960s – 1970s: Legislative Wins  
 The revitalization and transformation of the National Committee on Household 
Employment (NCHE) in the 1960s and 1970s was due largely to the influence of Edith 
Barksdale-Sloan, who was hired as the executive director in 1969 and transformed the 
organization and its local affiliates (Boris & Nadasen 2008; Nadasen 2012). The NCHE began as 
an organization concerned with the needs of liberal employers, but became a Black feminist 
workers’ organization. Barksdale-Sloan believed “the rights of social citizenship were precisely 
that – rights – rather than privileges or benefits,” writes Nadasen (2012, p. 80). Under the 
leadership of Barksdale-Sloan, the NCHE evolved from an advocacy organization that helped 
employers find “‘better’ maids” and trained “welfare mothers” to be economically independent 
to a membership-based organization committed to, in her own words, “winning good wages and 
benefits, raising consciousness and educating consumers of domestic services” (Boris & 
Nadasen, 2008, p. 422). This kind of organizing modality, which centers the experiences and 
strengths of those directly affected by the issue at hand, is more likely to succeed in meeting its 
goals.  
 Several other domestic worker organizations appeared in the late 1960s: National 
Domestic Workers Union of America, the Household Workers Organization, the Household 
Technicians Union, Domestics United, and others. Similar to the focus of domestic worker 
organizing at the turn of the 21st century, these groups sought work contracts, political power, 
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access to standard labor rights, coalition-building with privileged groups, and recognition of their 
inherent dignity and the respectability of the work (Boris & Nadasen 2008). 
 The domestic workers’ movement was part and parcel of the larger Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The Household Technicians of America (HTA), founded in 
1972 to be the national activist arm of the NCHE, lobbied Congress to include domestic workers 
in a major minimum wage package being voted on that year (Nadasen 2012). The HTA won the 
support of the House and the Senate, remarkably, and the bill passed, but Nixon vetoed it in 
1972. The movement continued, though it took a slightly different form: rather than trying to 
pass another separate minimum wage bill, activists focused on amending FLSA to include 
domestic workers among its covered workers. In 1974, the HTA and the NCHE secured a short-
lived victory: Congress amended FLSA to cover private household workers. In 1974, there were 
37 local domestic worker groups with 25,000 members (Boris & Klein 2012). The HTA and the 
NCHE created a cross-sector alliance with labor unions, civic and faith-based groups, and 
women’s organizations, including Service Employees International Union, the National 
Organization for Women, and the National Women’s Political Caucus, to pressure Congress 
(Nadasen 2012). In addition to lobbying by this diverse alliance, New York Representative 
Shirley Chisholm was a major force in securing the votes to pass the amendments to FLSA. She 
materially united all of the Black caucus and almost all of the women’s caucus in Congress to 
support the amendments, and in doing so, symbolically united the Black liberation movement 
and the women’s movement (Nadasen 2012).  
 The business lobby and disability rights’ groups were deeply opposed to the 1974 FLSA 
amendments. They argued that the financial burden on business owners and individual direct 
employers would be too great to shoulder; they would have to either lay off workers or go 
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without care. Also opposed were government officials – men – who were committed to 
maintaining the division of labor in the home. The officials saw the connection between the civil 
rights of domestic workers and the expectations they placed on their wives. Nadasen quotes 
Secretary of Labor Peter Brennan in 1973: “Your wife will want to get paid [for doing 
housework]. … So we have to be very careful unless we are ready to do dishes” (Nadasen, 2012, 
p. 82). They were threatened by what legitimizing domestic work as work would mean for their 
own lives as men.  
 The assumption that women had an innate ability or proclivity for housework continued, 
as did the connection between “dirty” work of house keeping, diaper changing, and toileting 
elders, and lower-class women workers of color, thus ensuring the power structure of the status 
quo was unchanged. “Women tend to see themselves as consumers of immigrant labor (as 
buying services) rather than employers…and most men do not see themselves as involved in the 
labor circuit of the private sphere at all,” write Altman and Pannell (2012, p. 301). The absurdity 
of this view does not need to be stated. Men (and women, in dual-income households) work in 
the public sphere for income that women use to buy the labor of other women as domestic 
workers. The duality of labor and capital is also linked to the racialization of domestic work. 
Labor is valued differently than the capital (and the capital holders) that produces and requires it. 
Those with capital are white, while those who work are off-white.  
 All told, the domestic worker movement had a mixed record of success in the legislative 
battles of the 1970s. Though the 1971 minimum wage bill was vetoed by Nixon, Congress 
passed the 1974 amendments to FLSA, which gave most domestic workers more rights as 
workers, including the right to the federal minimum wage. Yet, the amendments excluded vital 
sub-categories of domestic workers: babysitters, live-in workers, and home health aides 
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(Nadasen 2012; Boris & Klein 2010). The exclusion of these groups of workers has been deemed 
the “companionship exemption,” based on the occupation providing equal parts companionship 
and supportive domestic services, including washing and cooking, in the past. Another rationale 
for excluding babysitters and eldercare workers was that they supposedly did not support 
themselves and their families with this work (Boris & Klein 2010).  
 In 1975 the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division acted independently from 
Congress and removed home care workers – termed “elder companions” – from FLSA, 
effectively undoing the 1974 amendments (Boris & Klein 2010; Boris & Klein 2012). “What 
distinguished the companion from the domestic,” write Boris and Klein, “was the amount of time 
spent in housework not directly related to care” (2012; p. 132). This calculation did not consider 
the range of activities required to keep an elder or disabled person living in their own home. The 
1975 rule ignored 1974’s re-classification of home care workers and excluded workers employed 
by agencies as well – essentially excluding all workers whose site of labor was the home. 
 As Altman and Pannell write, “It is hard to make sense operationally of a job category 
that includes both skilled nursing care and scrubbing toilets. What ties the category together is 
not the type of work involved but the fact that women (paid or unpaid) are the ones…who are 
expected to do it” (2012, p. 305). The underlying commonality among domestic work is that it is 
done by women, in other women’s homes. Yet domestic employment was not taken up as a 
major feminist issue; most of the focus of the feminist movement in the 1970s, when it did focus 
on housework, was on the division of labor between the sexes in the home (Boris & Klein 2012).  
 Noted domestic labor historians Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein contend that “the 
conflation of home care with domestic labor…is historical and not merely some categorical 
equivalency” (2010, p. 188). By classifying care work as domestic work and thus linking it with 
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women and their innate skills, policymakers were able to keep care workers separate from skilled 
workers. Because they did perform some housekeeping tasks, such as laundry and cleaning, 
home care workers were “classified as domestic servants” and easily excluded from the 
protections and benefits skilled workers in the public sphere could expect: overtime, minimum 
wage, maximum hours, sick leave, unemployment, collective bargaining, and other labor laws 
(Boris & Klein, 2010, p. 188).  
 The increasing privatization of the welfare state, with the federal government shifting 
responsibility to local governments who then contracted with agencies, has also limited domestic 
workers’ rights. In most cases the state classified home care workers as independent contractors. 
Those employed by agencies would have previously been employed by the state, which would 
have been obligated to grant collective bargaining rights. In some cases, the county became the 
official employer for collective bargaining reasons, such as with California’s In-Home 
Supportive Services (Boris & Klein 2012). Employment agencies, legally exempt from FLSA 
after the 1975 rule, had no obligation to honor unionized workers or the rules of FLSA (Boris & 
Klein 2010). Confusion around who employed workers (the consumer, the government, or a 
private agency), different interpretations of FLSA, and successive amendments and repeals to 
FLSA created “a continuously uncertain legal situation” that resulted in conflicting court rulings 
(Boris & Klein, 2012, p. 133). 
 Barksdale-Sloan left the NCHE in 1975, and in 1977 the NCHE became part of the Urban 
League (Boris & Nadasen 2008). The NCHE had created workforce development programs with 
the support of federal money and foundation grants, training women in skilled housekeeping and 
eldercare, and presenting certificates of training, which professionalized the field and supported 
workers’ sense of dignity and pride in their work (Palmer 1984). These organizations achieved 
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real success, but “a poor women’s movement could not sustain itself without foundation grants, 
[and] funding agencies were fickle” (Boris & Nadasen, 2008, p. 424). The pilot projects were 
funded primarily through a multiyear federal Manpower training contract and the Ford 
Foundation. Although none of the NCHE pilot programs created a self-sustaining business, 
nonprofit organization, or worker cooperative, the projects did achieve their goals for education, 
training, and improved wages and working conditions for participants (Boris & Klein 2012).  
 Boris and Nadasen (2008) argue that a different kind of domestic workers’ movement 
was needed to guarantee the rights and respect domestic workers deserved. “It would take a new 
social movement to place private household workers under the labor law,” Boris and Klein write 
(2010, p. 420). It took years for this movement to materialize and gain traction.  
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Chapter 3. Domestic Work in Late Capitalism  
3.i. Late 20th- & Early 21st-Century Domestic Work Legislation 
 Recognizing the effects of globalization and neoliberalism on the family and work, 
domestic workers, allies, and employers changed tactics to include citizenship and immigrant 
rights as part of the domestic worker rights movement. Domestic worker organizers saw the link 
between the inflow of migrant women workers and the localized oppression of women in 
general. “Migration maintains deep-seated social (and thus economic) iniquities because it 
relieves pressure on men: they do not have to do housework because low-paid migrant women 
do their share and more,” write Altman and Pannell (2012, p. 302). Allying with migrant women 
was a tactic not just for a stronger domestic worker movement, but toward equitable distribution 
of housework and thus liberation for all women from the confines of traditional labor 
expectations. 
 The Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965 loosened immigration regulations and brought 
more competition to the field of domestic work (Nadasen 2012). The 1970s saw an increase in 
immigrants working in domestic service, which meant that employers had more opportunities for 
cheaper labor and often took advantage of that. “Despite the tangible way that immigration 
empowered employers and weakened the bargaining position of domestic workers, the leaders of 
the NCHE refused to buy into a larger discourse promoting deportation,” writes Nadasen (2012, 
p. 87). They recognized that working in concert would be more beneficial than combating 
immigrant workers; an unwinnable battle, given the United States’ historical, unwavering 
demand for cheap labor. The NCHE transitioned their organizing goals from obtaining national 
coverage under FLSA to local legislative campaigns.  
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 In 1976, domestic workers in New York State who were employed by a third-party, such 
as an agency, rather than directly by the person they worked for, won the right to collective 
bargaining (Boris & Nadasen 2008). But outside of unionization of home health aides in 
particular, a union of domestic workers has yet to be realized. Consumer-directed personal 
assistant programs (CDPAP) became available to Medicaid-eligible individuals in the 1980s, 
thanks to organizing by disability rights activists who wanted to manage their own home care 
and avoid unnecessary institutionalization (Bogart 2003). This innovation allowed families to 
select who would be their home health aide, paid for through Medicaid disbursements to local 
Departments of Social Services (Bogart 2003).  
 After more than ten years of community organizing, the New York State Domestic 
Workers Bill of Rights became law in 2010. New York was the first state to enact legislation that 
protected individual domestic workers and recognized them as workers. The Bill of Rights 
provides the following: time-and-a-half overtime pay after 40 hours for live-out workers or 44 
hours for live-in workers, protection against retaliation for complaining about violations of the 
law, one day of rest per week, three paid days off after one year of work, and minimum wage 
protections (NYS DOL n.d.). Additionally, employers must provide unemployment insurance 
and workers’ compensation for some workers depending on how long they have been employed 
and how many hours they work (Young 2010/2011). When the bill was passed, these protections 
did not apply to eldercare workers employed by an agency, as the 1975 rule voiding the 1974 
FLSA amendments was still in effect; not until 2015 were agency workers brought under FLSA 
and the NYS Domestic Workers Bill of Rights (US DOL n.d.). Combined with the decline in 
union power and membership nationally, the conflicting and confusing legislation around 
domestic work has made unionization difficult, and enforcement is even harder.  
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 The coalition that worked to pass the NYS Domestic Workers Bill of Rights included 
workers’ groups, immigrants’ groups, and allies in positions of power, including the organization 
Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (JFREJ), of which I was a part. I joined in fall 2011, a year 
after the Bill of Rights was passed, when JFREJ was working with its allies to figure out the next 
steps in the Shalom Bayit: Justice for Domestic Workers campaign. With small-scale initiatives 
like kitchen table conversations and living room gatherings, we brought employers together to 
discuss the ways in which they could adhere to the Bill of Rights and teach their friends and 
neighbors about it. The domestic worker justice movements of the early 21st century include 
vocal resistance to xenophobia from workers, immigrant groups, consumers/clients, scholars, 
artists, and allies. The movement rejects the scapegoating of any one group in favor of the larger 
movement for justice and equality, good care and good jobs for all.  
 
3.ii. Domestic Workers and International Migration 
 Because of the demand for foreign workers, whose presence enables middle-class women 
to leave the private sphere for work in the public sphere, and who do myriad other tasks that 
support middle-class life (landscaping, construction, restaurant work, farming, etc.), there is a 
deep ambivalence among policymakers and the American public about immigration policy. On 
the one hand, Americans continue to regard immigrants as Other, and relegate them to a second-
class status. On the other hand, they depend on immigrant labor. This ambivalence leads to 
“intentionally vague or arbitrarily enforced” immigration policy (Altman & Pannell, 2012, p. 
295).  
 Some migration policy proposals are framed around increasing the number of “skilled 
migrants,” but does not consider domestic work to be skilled, even though employers often 
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prefer women who have advanced education or multi-lingual abilities. This “educational 
capital,” according to Altman and Pannell, may be desired by employers but does not fit within 
the definition of skilled labor put forward by policymakers (2012, p. 298).  
  “When governments act in ways that undermine their own stated goals,” write Altman 
and Pannell, they generate a “policy gap” (2012, p. 291). The companionship exemption in 
FLSA is a prime example of a policy gap or failure: a confusing, restrictive labor rule that is 
contrary to other government policies and legislation. Immigrant domestic workers fall into two 
policy gaps: the regulation of immigration and the regulation of work. Without policies to 
address both labor law and immigration law, immigrant workers – particularly those at the 
intersection of non-regulated work and migration, such as domestic workers – will be more 
vulnerable to exploitation. Domestic worker advocacy groups have shown many instances of 
employers holding workers’ immigration documents or passports as a way to coerce them to 
work in unsafe conditions or to tolerate other forms of exploitation (Hafiz & Paarlberg 2017; 
Young 2010/2011). The policy gap results in the invisibilization of immigrant workers, the 
discounting of the vital contribution immigrant women workers make to the economy of the host 
country, and the eroding of democratic values by not honoring immigrant women for the work 
they do. Altman and Pannell call this a “specifically gender-inflicted [form] of racism” (2012, p. 
302).  
 The undeniable link between the increase in women’s labor force participation in host 
countries and the international migration of women to do paid domestic work cannot be ignored 
(Altman & Pannell 2012). Most women with children who can enter the public workforce in the 
United States rely on some kind of domestic work. “The upward mobility of women in host 
countries [is] dependent on the geographical mobility of women from elsewhere,” Altman and 
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Pannell write (2012, p. 300). Global inequality, particularly in the realm of care, is both a cause 
and effect of international migration. “Mutually constitutive global forces…produce the need for 
cheap domestic labor while simultaneously creating the conditions that make care work invisible, 
exploitative, and devalued,” writes Hankivsky (2014, p. 253). Women migrants contribute to the 
changing face of reproductive labor; it can also be said that the reorganization of reproductive 
labor contributes to women’s international migration. An increase in women migrants and an 
increase in labor force participation among women in receiving countries are co-constitutive.  
 This leads to an analysis of migration: what factors cause women to migrate? Douglas 
Massey (1999) outlines six major theories of international migration, which can be separated into 
two groups: neoclassical economics and new economics; and segmented labor market, world 
systems, social capital, and cumulative causation.  
Neoclassical economics views migration as based on a cost-benefit analysis made by 
migrants dictating movement to wherever economic returns on migration are highest. This overly 
simplistic view is contrasted with the new economics of migration, which is a more well-rounded 
approach. Similar to neoclassical economics, it recognizes that multiple factors are at work in 
determining migration, including family units, relative wealth, and other options to increase 
income. These two economic theories are at odds in a subtle but important way: Neoclassical 
believes the cause for migration originates in the geographic income and labor disparity: people 
leave because they can get more lucrative work in other places. New economics believes that 
multiple factors, including relative income, relative social status and general financial security, 
contribute to the decision to leave.  
 The other four theories of migration include economic factors in their reasoning, of 
course, but also consider the wider social and political landscape of sending countries.  
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The segmented labor market theory is broader than either of economic theories, and 
understands migration to be caused by forces larger than the individual or family unit: so-called 
“pull forces” of consistent, cheap, flexible labor (Massey, 1999, p. 37). This is the labor that 
allows middle-class women to work outside the home. Massey describes four reasons that 
modern industrial societies always need this kind of labor: structural inflation, inherent duality of 
labor and capital, difficulty in attracting ‘native’ workers, and the necessity of a constant flow of 
new workers to do this undesirable work.  
World systems theory sees the preceding three theories as part of a larger “dependency 
theory” (Massey, 1999, p. 40): Migration is a result of the spread, demands, and allure of 
capitalist economies and societies. This historical-structural explanation draws on geographic 
distribution of labor, capital, and unequal power to explain that migration is a consequence of 
global capitalist development and exploitation. Borders – i.e., modern nation-states – reinforce 
capitalism and inequality in the labor market and regulate immigration based on ideas of 
nationhood and belonging (Zolberg 1999). 
Social capital theory, or the social networks migrants establish, determines that 
interpersonal connections facilitate migration. Communication, transportation, housing, social 
and political support systems or affinity groups, ethnic enclaves, employment – all are 
augmented by a robust social network. When people have relatives or friends who have already 
migrated who they can turn to for help or resources, the ensuing cost and risks of migration are 
lowered. In fact, the strength of the social networks of migrants can eclipse the original financial 
incentives of migration (Portes & Rumbaut 2006). 
Cumulative causation is a deep and broad analysis of the causes of international 
migration. This model describes eight aspects or results of migration that build on each other to 
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increase the incidence of future migration: social capital vis-à-vis social networks, relative 
income, land ownership, agricultural opportunities, evolving customs and culture, the ‘brain 
drain,’ the changing meaning of work, and a reduction in the migrant class itself (due to said 
migration). The compounding of these elements generate “social infrastructure” that in turn 
facilitates smoother processes of migration for the next generation (Massey, 1999, p. 49). 
 A deep understanding of migration cannot be restricted to just one of the above-
mentioned theories; all six may be complementary. A single unifying theory of migration, 
according to Massey (1999), must incorporate five elements: the forces that promote emigration, 
the forces that attract immigrants, who migrates and why, what connects the sending and host 
countries, and the role of the state. When considering migration and care work, scholars and 
policymakers must engage in an intersectional analysis of care and care workers (Hankivsky 
2014). The lived experiences of migrant workers cannot be separated from their experiences of 
their identities, which are further compounded by the intersections of their identities. Employing 
an intersectional analysis of identity will lead to a more nuanced understanding of migrant care 
workers’ experiences and more comprehensive care and migration policies.  
 Demand for foreign workers – or other easily oppressed workers, those who tolerate low 
wages and unsafe conditions – is built into the societal fabric of the United States (Altman & 
Pannell 2012; Foner 1998). The demand for, acceptance of, and reliance on these workers, along 
with the simultaneous vilification of immigrants, serves to invisibilize the workers whose labor is 
the very foundation of the country. The narrative of the mainstream women’s movement in the 
1960s and 70s projected the idea that liberation for women was linked to their liberation from the 
home; by entering the public sphere and joining the workforce, women will have “made it.” Yet 
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without the work of immigrant laborers who take over the work of women in the private sphere, 
middle-class women cannot leave the home for the public workforce. 
 The middle-class woman in the 2000s who chooses to stay home and raise children may 
not see her choice as part of systemic oppression of women, but this choice is made in a 
gendered context and has gendered consequences. Women still receive less compensation than 
men for work in the public sphere. This is caused by and causes women to drop out of the formal 
labor force. One consequence of this is that wages for domestic labor are also low (Altman & 
Pannell 2012). However, the problem of low-paid women cannot be solved on an individual 
level. One woman, or several, choosing to act one way or the other does not make a dent in the 
systems of institutional oppression that cause and uphold women’s lower pay in the formal labor 
market, patterns of migration, or pay scales and benefits for domestic workers. Altman and 
Pannell liken tackling these issues on an individual basis to “walking to work [to] solve the 
problem of global climate change” (2012, p. 303). A systemic oppression calls for a systemic 
solution; to get there, middle-class women should leverage their privilege to effect policy 
changes. This does not mean that individual efforts are entirely inconsequential; on the contrary, 
initiatives like the Fair Care Pledge, in which domestic employers pledge to honor labor laws and 
common-sense suggestions, are raising the public’s awareness of domestic work as a real job and 
encouraging women to see themselves as employers. In tandem with legislation like the NYS 
Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, these efforts will legitimize domestic work and break down the 
fallacy of a private sphere free from regulation.  
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3.iii. International Domestic Work Policies  
 In the United States, the lack of regulations and supports for domestic workers and 
employers can be directly linked to the legacy of slavery and gender essentialism as manifested 
as institutional racism and sexism. The US federal government is primarily concerned with 
productivity, and fostering it to grow the country’s capital. To counter the government’s and 
society’s focus on economic production, “Tronto (2013) has called for societies to put 
responsibilities for care at the center of their democratic political agendas” (Hankivsky, 2014, p. 
253). As a country that is founded on the primacy of individual liberty rather than collective 
wellbeing, US policy will always skew towards protecting the individual over the group. 
Compared to lifetime measures of success in other industrialized nations, the United States pales. 
From high infant and maternal mortality to shorter life expectancy, the US lags. The US is the 
only industrialized nation without paid family leave or national healthcare. These fundamental 
parts of human existence – to live healthfully, to receive care, to provide care, to rest – are not 
guaranteed, and are certainly not funded, in the United States. Radical changes in state thinking 
would be required if we are to engender a caring society. The United States stands in contrast 
with “welfare states” of Europe, who prioritize the health and well-being of their residents over 
the capital they create.  
 In 2004, the city of Brussels launched a system in which individual employers may hire 
domestic workers through a local employment agency (“ALE”) that hires and trains workers. 
Employers receive a tax break in exchange for using the agency. This tax break incentivizes 
sourcing employment through ALE, which provides workers with training, steady employment, 
an annual salary, on-the-job insurance, and job placement (City of Brussels n.d.[a]). One must be 
unemployed for a fixed amount of time to become an agency employee (City of Brussels 
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n.d.[b]). Use of this voucher system disincentivizes reliance on the black market and pays 
workers a living wage. If enacted in New York, it would also ensure that workers’ wage benefits 
are being contributed to Social Security. 
 In Belgium, domestic workers fall under the scope of “joint committees,” which are part 
of the Christian trade union confederation. Any regulation or protections the joint committees 
succeed in obtaining also cover and apply to domestic workers. Every two years, the joint 
committees meet and negotiate for better protections for their workers. Then they send out an 
update to all affected workers – including domestic workers – to inform them of their increased 
protections and new rights. The joint committees operate as a kind of collective bargaining unit 
on behalf of many informal and trade workers (Greatti 2011).  
 The Christian trade union confederation was initially against the ALE voucher program. 
One reason for opposition given by Pia Stalpaert, president of the food and services union 
affiliated with the trade union confederation, was objection to unemployed persons being forced 
to do housekeeping work (Greatti 2011). This illustrates the still common opinion of 
housekeeping as lacking prestige or skill, and being unvalued. In fact, only negative views of the 
profession diminish its dignity, not the work itself; a high level of expertise is required to be a 
good housekeeper. Stalpaert’s attitude shifted when the workers in the trade union were 
enthusiastic about being part of the committee, but her objection still betrays the imbalance of 
power and respect within the committee system towards domestic workers.  
 The ALE voucher system also includes an essential provision: full legal citizenship for 
workers. Without this, the system could never obtain its goal of protecting all workers and 
bringing workers out of the shadows. The current climate in the European Union against 
international migrants and refugees has created an analogous movement against the rights of 
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foreigners to become citizens. Stalpaert described the benefits of the voucher system (Greatti 
2011):  
...[T]he service voucher system breaks with the ‘master and servant’ 
relationship of subordination. The workers are grouped together within an 
agency that becomes their legal employer and households in turn become 
customers rather than bosses. As a result, the workers are part of an actual 
company, they have colleagues and belong to a group. They have access to 
training and their rights are defended by trade union representatives.  
 
Domestic work comes out of the private sphere and begins to be seen as public because the 
grouping of workers ameliorates isolation experienced by both workers and employers.  
 Part-time domestic staff, and possibly those who are not employed through the agency 
system, are not entitled to social security or employment contracts. This is where the Belgian 
joint committee organizers are focusing their efforts now, as well as ratification of the 
International Labor Organization’s Convention 189, which provides these and other benefits 
(ILO 2011).  
 Stalpaert tacitly identifies some of the most difficult aspects of organizing for domestic 
workers: an isolated workplace, the emotional component of the work, and the power and 
privilege most employers do not recognize. Because, as Stalpaert says, “the workers are part of 
an actual company,” they are able to relate to their employers as customers, and the power 
dynamic shifts. For many employers, accepting the identity of “employer” is a fraught process, 
especially because the owning class is not taught to identify its privilege (Hand in Hand 2017). 
When workers are not able to bargain collectively, manipulation, exploitation, mistreatment, and 
wage theft are much more likely to occur, and there is a reduced opportunity for career 
development or professionalization.  
 In 2011, the International Labour Organization, a specialized agency of the United 
Nations, drafted Convention 189 to provide protections for domestic workers around the world. 
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C189 includes protection from child labor, freedom to bargain collectively, basic human rights 
protections, protection from abuse and retaliation upon reporting abuse, the right to a written 
contract, privacy protections, decent wages and living conditions, occupational safety and health, 
remuneration, access to precise terms of employment, and more (ILO 2011). Though hundreds of 
countries, including the United States and Belgium, have signed on to the convention, its 
ratification is not widespread. Finland, Germany, Ireland and Italy are the only EU countries to 
have ratified the convention (Normlex 2016).  
 Pressure for reforms is building. International unions and community organizing groups 
are pressing for its ratification in Belgium and the United States. Solidar, a conglomeration of 
social justice NGOs in Europe, presented their 2015 Silver Rose Award in Organizing 
International Solidarity to the International Domestic Workers Federation (Solidar 2015). 
Conferences on domestic work and collective bargaining initiatives abound, and these increase 
international pressure to ratify C189.  
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Chapter 4. A Closer Look at Home Health Care: A New Model for New Yorkers  
4.i. Home Health Care Workers and Consumers 
 Home health care has been a bourgeoning industry in the United States for almost 20 
years. Consistently ranking among the top fields of growth, home health care services are going 
to continue to be in demand as Baby Boomers age. With increased life expectancy and the 
independence Baby Boomers expect and are used to, the market for home health care and for 
aging in place initiatives will surely, necessarily, increase. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
estimates that nationally, one million new direct care jobs will be needed by 2024 (Espinoza 
2017).  
 The think tank PHI estimates that nationally, there are 2.2 million homecare workers, 
including those counted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and around 800,000 who are employed 
directly by consumers or through consumer-directed programs (PHI 2016). In New York City, 
and nationally, about 90% of the workforce is women (ACS 2015; PHI 2016). The median 
hourly wage for healthcare support workers in NYC is $13; for those specifically working as 
personal care aides and home health aides, hourly wage decreases to just under $11 (Weissman 
Center 2015). However, fully 50% of direct care workers leave their job within a year of starting 
(Espinoza 2017). This is due to poor working conditions, low pay, and the lack of career 
advancement or salary increases. 
 Domestic workers are the most trafficked population in New York City, comprising 80% 
of reported cases (Hafiz & Paarlberg 2017). Findings from the National Domestic Workers 
Alliance’s Beyond Survival Campaign indicate a terrible rate of abuse. Among trafficked 
domestic workers, 45% report being in fear of physical harm if they were to try to leave their 
employment situation; 62% report having their passports or other ID taken away from them by 
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employers; 66% report having experienced physical or sexual abuse, either by their employer or 
a family member of their employer; and 85% of domestic worker trafficking survivors report 
having pay withheld or being paid well below minimum wage (Hafiz & Paarlberg 2017). 
 A 2006 report on domestic workers in New York City found that over two-thirds of 
workers surveyed did not receive overtime pay, one-third experienced verbal or physical abuse, 
and almost 40% could not afford medical care when they needed it (DWU & DataCenter 2006). 
Over the past ten years, these figures have changed, but not necessarily for the better. 
Nationwide in 2012, 20% of domestic workers surveyed reported that there were times in the 
previous month when there was no food to eat in their homes because of lack of funds; 23% were 
paid below the state minimum wage; and 70% were paid less than $13 per hour (Burnham & 
Theodore 2012). New York State increased the minimum wage so that all workers in NYC, 
regardless of field of employment, will receive $15 per hour by 2021 (Cook 2017).  
 
Figure 1. Data from US DOL 2013. 
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 As the above figure shows, almost two-thirds of the revenue of the home care industry 
comes from government funds in the form of Medicaid and Medicare. More revenue comes from 
individual out-of-pocket spending than private health insurance, so the state should make long-
term care insurance a worthwhile investment.  
The New York State Partnership for Long Term Care (NYSPLTC) is an insurance 
program run by the NYS Department of Health. The program allows individuals and couples to 
protect their assets and avoid the Medicaid “spend-down,” which is often required to use 
Medicaid-funded services, like staying in a nursing home or accessing Medicaid-funded home 
care. The spend-down is required because Medicaid only serves financially destitute seniors. 
This program allows individuals and their spouse to keep some of their assets and monthly 
income and still use Medicaid-run programs. “If an individual/couple purchases a Partnership 
insurance policy and keeps it in effect, the State will protect them, if otherwise eligible, against 
the costs of extended care situations through the Medicaid program” (NYS DOH 2017). In other 
words, the assets of Medicaid-eligible qualified Partnership policyholder (ME QPP) are 
disregarded in determining eligibility for Medicaid Extended Coverage. Thus, the policyholder 
does not need to engage in a spend-down. The program is limited in what is allows for assets and 
monthly income, as illustrated by the table below. 
Table 1. Data from NYS DOH 2017 
The New York State Department of Financial Services has requirements for long-term 
care insurance policies offered in NYS. They must cover, at a minimum of 24 consecutive 
New York State Long Term Care Financial Allowance 
Long Term Home Care Resource Allowance 
Monthly Income 
Allowance, Individual 
Monthly Income 
Allowance, ME QPP 
Applicant $14,850 $825 $1,490 
Applicant with spouse $21,750 $1,209 $3,022.50 
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months, at least $100 per day for a nursing home in the NYC Metropolitan area (five boroughs, 
Long Island, and Rockland and Westchester Counties) and $70 per day in the rest of the state. 
For home care, the programs must cover at least 50% of the “daily indemnity amount” (NYS 
DFS n.d.[a]). Some policies offer more than these amounts. The NYSPLTC has a nursing home 
daily benefit allowance of $304 and a home care allowance of $152, significantly higher than 
long-term care offered through private insurers. In NYC, the NYS Department of Health has 
estimated average nursing home costs to be $395 per day in 2015, and the NYS Department of 
Financial Services puts average home care costs at $20 per hour in 2011, as reported by home 
care agencies (NYS DFS n.d.[b]; NYS DOH 2015). 
 New York City’s Department for the Aging (DFTA) is tasked with implementing Age 
Friendly NYC, a policy initiative launched by Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2009, which 
proposes 59 strategies to make the city more livable for seniors. In 2010, NYC became the first 
member of the World Health Organization’s Global Network of Age-Friendly Cities (Corrado 
2016). Though DFTA has a strong plan for improving the quality of life for the city’s aging 
residents in Age Friendly NYC, it does not specifically address the issue of home health care. 
Examining the demographics of the eldercare workforce and the population it serves in New 
York City will help legislators, advocates, and community members create a home health system 
that works for everyone.  
 In 2015, the American Community Survey (ACS) counted 8.55 million New York City 
residents. 1.1 million (13%) are 65 or older. Of these, 668,000 (59%) are women (ACS 2015). 
According to the DFTA 2017 Annual Plan, New Yorkers aged 60 and older will comprise 20.6% 
of the total population by 2040, with a 15.6% increase from 2000. By 2040, New York City’s 
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60+ population is projected to reach 1.86 million, a 48.5% increase from 2000. By 2040, women 
over 85 will outnumber men in the same category by almost two to one (Corrado 2016).  
 The percentage of minority older New Yorkers is increasing, in some cases dramatically, 
as the percentage of white older New Yorkers is decreasing (Corrado 2016). About 50% of New 
Yorkers 65 and older speak only English, but over 100,000 older New Yorkers do not speak 
English at all (ACS 2015). The percentage of minority elderly living in poverty is significantly 
higher than white elderly. Data indicate that a substantial proportion of minority older people 
live in poverty: 30% of Hispanics, 26% of Asians, and 18% of Blacks (Corrado 2016).  
Race and Poverty for NYC Population 65+ 
Race 65+ 2000 Census 
65+ 2015 
ACS % Change 
% Below 
Poverty 2014 
White (Non-Hispanic) 534,000 1.2m 44% 12.9% 
Black 185,000 300,000 62% 18.1% 
Hispanic 139,000 276,000 50% 30.2% 
Asian/Pacific Islanders 59,000 151,000 39% 26.1% 
Table 2. Data from Corrado 2016 and ACS 2015 
 New York City’s older adults experienced an increase in poverty from 16.5% to 19.3% 
from 1990-2014 (Corrado 2016). 4% of all city households receive some form of public 
assistance. Nearly 200,000 city residents over age 65 are living in poverty; this represents 2.5% 
of NYC’s entire population, and close to 20% of New Yorkers over 65 (ACS 2015). Poverty 
rates among older women are higher than men, regardless of race: 21% of all women live below 
the poverty level, compared to 16.8% of all men (Corrado 2016). This is because of women’s 
lower Social Security earnings, due to lower wages throughout their lives and time taken off 
from paid work to care and work for family.  
 Median income for New Yorkers over 65 also varies significantly by race. In 2014, the 
median household income for older New Yorkers was $32,000, lower than the nation’s median 
of $39,200 (Corrado 2016). In 2014, the median income of Hispanic households was 59% less 
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than whites; Black households, 24% less than whites; and Asian households, 47% less than 
whites.  
2014 Median Income for NYC and National Population 65+ 
Population Segment 65+ 2014 Median Income 
White (Non-Hispanic) $42,500 
Black $32,500 
Asian/Pacific Islanders $22,500 
Hispanic $17,500 
All 65+ NYers $32,000 
All 65+ Americans $39,200 
Table 3. Data from DFTA 2016 and ACS 2015 
 ACS reports that of the one million New Yorkers 65 and older, 300,000 receive SNAP or 
other forms of means-tested social welfare (ACS 2015). This figure has risen by about ten 
thousand each year since 2011, the first year such data was collected (NYC Mayor’s Office of 
Operations 2016). But, it must be noted that not all older adults who are eligible for SNAP 
programs utilize them (Corrado 2016). Despite – and because of – this high rate of poverty 
among older New Yorkers, nearly 30% of those 60 and older are still working. 
NYC 60+ Population in Labor Force, by Sex 
Age Men in Labor Force % of pop Women in Labor Force % of pop 
60 and 61 59,000 68% 61,000 56% 
62 – 64 64,000 56% 67,000 47% 
65 – 69 55,000 37% 55,000 28% 
70 – 74 22,000 21% 19,000 13% 
75+ 16,000 1% 11,000 4% 
60+ 216,000 34% 213,000 24% 
Table 4. Data from ACS 2015 
 This data shows the vulnerability of the aging population in New York. Almost all – 96% 
– of the population 65 and older in NYC lives in households, while only 4% live permanently in 
a group housing situation (ACS 2015). Nine percent of men and almost 22% of women live 
alone (ACS 2015). What kind of support can 200,000 poverty-stricken seniors hope to receive? 
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 Many times, support comes from family. Research reported in DFTA’s 2017 Annual Plan 
calculated that in New York, “approximately 3 million caregivers provide more than 2.6 billion 
hours of unpaid care to loved ones each year at an estimated worth of $32 billion” (Corrado, 
2016, p. 19). Nationwide, family caregiving amounts to $470 billion – more than total out-of-
pocket healthcare expenses or total Medicaid spending (Reinhard, Feinberg, Choula, & Houser 
2015). These family caregivers report being late to work or missing work to care for family; 
nearly 70% have had to rearrange their work schedule, work fewer hours, or take an unpaid leave 
to accommodate caregiving duties. And, the future availability of family caregivers is declining, 
according to the AARP (Reinhard et al. 2015). 
 
4.ii. A New Model for Home Health Care in New York  
 As the population ages and more Americans find themselves in the Sandwich Generation 
– caring for parents and children simultaneously – society will face a care crisis. About 10,000 
people turn 65 every day (Cohn & Taylor 2010). This crisis bridges multiple issues that affect 
every level of civil society and government: children, parents, the elderly; independent 
contractors, for- and non-profit agencies, trade schools; state-run licensing, regulations, and 
enforcement; the healthcare industry as a whole. Society must figure out how to help families 
afford quality care, empower workers, and close the wage gap for women who, in the prime of 
their careers, are caring for their – and/or someone else’s – parents and children.  
 In the face of proposed substantial cuts to social welfare programs from the Trump 
Administration, activist groups must take a lesson from domestic worker organizers in the past 
and unite through race, class, age, nationality, gender, and religious differences. Pressuring local 
officials and publicly shaming Trump and his supporters for their un-caring policies is the only 
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way to guarantee the survival of these marginalized groups – the aged and infirm, immigrants, 
women, the undocumented workforce that is the backbone of the United States – in the 21st 
century. A multi-issue campaign that centers care will be able to solve many of these problems 
and will increase many Americans’ quality of life. 
 Based on the model in Belgium and recent domestic worker organizing successes in New 
York, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, and Washington, I propose a new model for 
eldercare in New York City. The city has been a locus of domestic worker organizing since 
before the New Deal, and its current left-leaning government and population, combined with its 
robust civil and constituent services programs, make it a good case study for a new model for 
home health care.  
 Through a matching program for workers and employers, a public-private partnership 
financing training and electronic resources, and collaboration with public education workforce 
development programs, eldercare can be envisioned as a skilled, dignified, well-paid form of 
labor. Care work is demanding physically and emotionally. The emotional labor of care, 
something that is almost universally ignored, can be as much of a burden as the physical labor. A 
worker-run care cooperative is one solution.  
 In New York City, there could be a single cooperative home care agency that is a public-
private partnership. Maintained by the state with support from workers’ groups and industry, 
such an organization would bring all workers “out of the shadows,” as contemporary domestic 
worker organizers say, and require fair work contracts, adherence to local labor laws, on-the-job 
insurance protection, protection from employer retaliation, and more. Funding would come from 
several streams: the Federal government as part of Medicaid block grants; state government, in 
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allocations to the Department for the Aging and social welfare services; private non-profits, who 
can fundraise; and grants from philanthropies.  
Workers would be guaranteed a living wage, and employers would pay on a means-tested 
sliding scale. The agency would be run as a co-op, meaning workers would do different tasks to 
keep the organization running. Home health care work is some of the most taxing work that 
people do: not only are there often injuries from physical tasks, there is also the emotional labor 
that goes into caring for someone. Structured as a co-op, the workers can rotate between direct 
care and management, including website design and development, customer service, fundraising, 
accounting, and human resources. This diversifies workers’ skills and helps stave off burnout in 
this trying field. 
 Such an organization, a partnership between the city, the state, and home care agencies, 
would facilitate high quality care and care jobs. A liaison would work with the Department for 
the Aging, the Department of Education, workforce development organizations, and advocacy 
groups to streamline the process of finding and hiring a qualified domestic worker – and for the 
workers to find safe and respectful employment. Such a program would provide some redress to 
the workers who are grappling with the racist and sexist legacies of the field, as well as current 
prejudices. 
 Whether employed by an agency or directly, the worker’s compensation, work hours, and 
labor protections should be uniform. All workers should be entitled to payroll tax benefits, like 
paying into Social Security and Medicare that they can access when they retire. If NYC adopts a 
centralized system of finding and hiring a worker, employers will not need to wring their hands 
in frustration at finding qualified caregivers, or worry about paying an agency a premium while 
the worker receives barely above minimum wage. Workers will know they are protected from 
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abuse and exploitation by the formal nature of the work agreement. The whole process will be 
public, with the city as the intermediary. 
 With the support of NGOs – including unions, religious organizations, and community 
organizations – greater policy and funding attention can be directed to this issue. There is no 
shortage of deep, meaningful, loving relationships between direct care workers and clients. The 
key is making sure that the quality of life and work for domestic workers is as good as what they 
provide to their clients. 
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Conclusion 
 In 1675, wealthy white Englishman Nathaniel Bacon, living in the colony of Virginia, 
united indentured servants and slaves across racial lines with the goal of seizing Native 
American land. When the governor of Virginia refused to support Bacon and his vigilantes, he 
redirected his anger towards them, the powerful. Bacon’s Rebellion showed that, with a common 
cause, poor whites and poor Blacks could be united. The class-consciousness Bacon developed, 
and his ability to catalyze this awareness into a tool that proved greater than the tool of racial 
projects, terrified those in power, and “hastened the transition to racial slavery” (WGBH 1999). 
In response to Bacon’s Rebellion, elites granted certain privileges to whites only, ensuring that 
poor whites had a stake in maintaining racial divisions because they benefitted from this “racial 
bribe” (Alexander, 2012, p. 25). 
 The quelling of Bacon’s Rebellion can be seen as the first time racism was used as a tool 
to unify whites across class lines. When poor whites realized they could gain something from 
their whiteness, racial difference won out over anything a cross-race alliance could offer them. 
The acceptance of the racial bribe, in which whites chose race-based power over class-based 
solidarity, has affected almost every aspect of life in the United States, from the emergence and 
negotiation of labor laws during the New Deal, to housing and affirmative action programs in the 
20th century, to recognizing domestic and care work as true work.  
 Those in power have often pitted their subordinates against each other, deflecting the 
blame from themselves or from the institutional systems (i.e., capitalism) that are the true 
culprits of inequality. As Trump attempts to cut funding for the National Endowment of the Arts 
in order to grow the military, he switches the national conversation from the problem of 
imperialism towards the (ir)relevance of art. The suppression of Bacon’s Rebellion was one way 
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whites in power, with a vested interest in the continued subordination of Blacks (or anyone they 
could underpay and overwork), were able to unite elites. The powerful framed class as something 
that could be neutralized or transcended, and inequality as a necessary byproduct of the 
economics of the new United States (Mullings 2005). The conversation switched from labor 
exploitation to immutable differences between whites and Blacks. 
 Racial reification “took root” in the New World via use of labor from sub-Saharan Africa 
(Harrison, 1995, p. 51). Though prejudice and structural discrimination existed before then, there 
was not the same rigid link between whiteness and superiority. Slavery in ancient Greece was not 
considered biological and did not have systemic implications (Harrison 1995; Mullings 2005). 
Racism is a socioeconomic consequence of capitalism in the New World. Though whiteness 
combined with other axes of identity can create an oppressed existence and whites can 
experience oppression, a marginalized white person is always still able to leverage white 
privilege. As Hankivsky argues, because the global care chain reflects and upholds racism, neo-
colonialism, patriarchy, and classism, legislative policy to address care and migration must also 
address these issues (2014).  
 The enduring disrespect toward the industry of paid domestic labor can be directly traced 
to the origins of paid domestic labor in the United States. The shockwaves and legacy of slavery 
have not worn off. Though class and gender are also key components of maintaining the status 
quo, race is what was traded on by the Modern Woman of the 1920s, race is what led to the 
Southern Concession during the 1937 FLSA negotiations, race is what allows home care workers 
to be considered at the end of state budgeting, race is what the Modern Woman of the Aughts 
trades on when she enters the workforce and employs an immigrant nanny. Although other 
identities and realities, such as gender, disability, class, and education, interact with whiteness to 
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contribute to one’s full sense of self and position in the social and political order. In the United 
States, race is the strongest marker of privilege, more durable and visible than class or other 
identifications. The historic, explicit exclusion of domestic workers from various labor laws can 
be directly traced to race-based oppression. Interracial movement-building gained a toehold with 
the coalition that fought for the New York State Domestic Workers Bill of Rights.  
 Aside from the legislative victory of the 2010 passage of the NYS Domestic Workers Bill 
of Rights, the most powerful initiative to emerge from Jews for Racial & Economic Justice’s 
Shalom Bayit: Justice for Domestic Workers campaign was the Eldercare Dialogues. Held in 
coordination with the Bill of Rights campaign coalition members Domestic Workers United, 
Adhikaar, Damayan, and other activist groups, the Dialogues brought together workers and 
seniors to discuss their shared visions for just and quality care and care jobs. The Eldercare 
Dialogues met every other month for almost two years, often at the social hall of Congregation 
B’nai Jeshurun on the Upper West Side. The mix of Jewish and Black elders talking about their 
fears of aging, of stable work, of finding care and finding jobs and financial security, was 
formidable. Through sharing their stories, they developed relationships as allies, not just 
advocates. Hankivsky comments the success of this coalition: “Such coalition efforts do not 
erase the differences among workers, but they allow for resistance and activism based on 
overlapping concerns and experiences” (2014, p. 261). 
 As a means to resist racism and other hierarchies, Jews for Racial & Economic Justice 
(JFREJ) began to focus on developing the leadership of marginalized Jews. Instead of focusing 
on the largest pool of activist members, drawn from traditionally empowered young, white, 
middle-class Ashkenazi women, JFREJ focused on Jews of color, Mizrahi and Sephardic Jews, 
Jewish elders, Jews raised poor or working-class, and transgender Jews. This in turn shaped the 
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goals of the organization, and was one reason the domestic worker justice campaign in that 
particular form concluded in 2015.  
 Shalom Bayit: Justice for Domestic Workers had achieved its legislative goal five years 
prior, with the passage of the NYS Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, and was now a campaign 
without a concrete goal or end point. With JFREJ Board, staff, and members agitating for a 
transfer of resources and focus from the privileged Ashkenazi members to the marginalized 
members, a new campaign with new goals needed to be articulated. Thus Shalom Bayit was 
closed, and the Caring Majority campaign was introduced.  
 Based on the idea of tapping the silent national majority of Americans invested in 
transforming care, from the ideas of Ai-Jen Poo’s eponymous book, the Caring Majority 
campaign was a multi-issue one, centering the needs and skills of the most marginalized in the 
Jewish and domestic worker communities: people of color, poor people, people whose housing 
and income were fragile, people who had to choose between paying for food and paying for 
medicine, people who worked to care for others and relied on social welfare to support their 
meager paychecks, people receiving care whose limits were stretched because they did not 
qualify for Medicaid but could not afford to pay out of pocket – living wage or no. This shift in 
focus, both campaign focus and membership focus, can be linked to Bacon’s Rebellion. JFREJ 
and allied organizations saw the power of uniting marginalized whites with marginalized non-
whites (i.e., elders & domestic workers). Bridging groups based on access to health care and 
quality jobs, across race and class lines but towards a common goal, led to an incredibly 
powerful movement base, one that is ready to mobilize during the Trump Administration for 
greater protections for workers and employers. 
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 Even modest change toward funding progressive causes or greater funding for social 
welfare programs has been incredibly hard to eke out with a Democratic Congress. Codified 
labor protections for domestic workers and other vulnerable members of society did not come 
easily. With the current Republican supermajority, radical changes such as a worker cooperative, 
a public-private care partnership, and a rethinking of care as integral to the wellbeing of society 
will be nearly impossible to achieve for the next few years at least. Rather than focusing on 
federal legislation, a state-based approach to revamping the care system is the most likely route 
to lasting reform. Luckily, with a robust network of elders, workers, and activists, a new model is 
within reach.  
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